What are arguments for solipsism

The problem of solipsism

The New Paradigm of Psychology pp 216-226 | Cite as

Part of the Philosophy of Science Science and Philosophy book series (WWP, volume 28)


Another central problem of radical constructivism is that because of the rejection of representationism or any image theory, an epistemological standpoint must be sought for the individual. This has already been discussed in the first part of the thesis. One can call this point of view generally solipsistic. In philosophy, solipsism as a tradition of thought has a long history, which we will not go into in detail here. Solipsism can be understood as theoretical egoism, of which SCHOPENHAUER once said in “The World as Will and Concept” that its radical representatives belong in a madhouse (cf. SCHISCHKOFF 1965). However, one could rightly ask whether its reduction of knowledge to the will must not consequently also lead to an ultimately solipsistic point of view.

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© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 1989

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